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In this survey, the subject of Administrative Law is con-
fined to those cases and statutes concerning the powers and
procedures of administrative agencies. It does not include any
agency rules or regulations, nor any discussion of the sub-
stantive provisions of any statutes involved.
LEGISLATION
Two statutes of interest in this field were adopted by the
Legislature during the year. The first' is of general interest
and relates to venue for review of administrative actions by
the Circuit Courts.
It provides:
The circuit courts of this State are hereby vested with
jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions, actions,
and controversies, other than those involving rates of
public service companies for which specific procedures
for review are provided in Title 58, Code of Laws, 1952,
affecting boards, commissions, and agencies of the State
of South Carolina, and officials of the State of South
Carolina in their official capacities, in the circuit where
such question, action, or controversy shall arise.
It appears that the intent of this act is to provide for venue
outside Richland County, but the choice of the word "jurisdic-
tion" leaves it open to argument that the courts are hereby
*Associate Professor, University of South Carolina, School of Law.
1. S. C. ACTS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS 1954 No. 624, p. 1541.
"§1. Circuit Court to have jurisdiction of actions affecting state
agencies. The circuit courts of this State are hereby vested with juris-
diction to hear and determine all questions, actions, and controversies,
other than those involving rates of public service companies for which
specific procedures for review are provided in Title 58, Code of Laws,
1952, affecting boards, commissions, and agencies of the State of South
Carolina, and officials of the State of South Carolina in their official
capacities, in the circuit where such question, action, or controversy
shall arise.
"§2. Repeal.-All acts or parts of acts inconsistent herewith are hereby
repealed.
"§3. Time effective.-This act shall take effect upon its approval by
the Governor.
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given jurisdiction to review de novo all administrative actions
except those specifically exempted.
The second statute2 is of limited application because it re-
defines "benefit year" under the Unemployment Compensa-
tion Law but should be noted, for it changes the statute to
avoid the interpretation of it by the court in the case of Harts-
ville Cotton Mill v. S. C. Employment Security Commission.3
DECISIONS
Evidence to Support Findings of Fact
During the period under consideration, the Supreme Court
decided four cases 4 in which it had occasion to comment that
the findings of fact by an administrative agency are binding
on the courts in a review thereof if supported by substantial
evidence. The language was not the same in each case as they
arose under different statutes, but the concept was the same,
whether the language was "competent evidence", "prima facie
correct", or simply "any evidence". Indicative of this is the
fact that in Gurley v. Mills Mill,5 the Court used "any evi-
dence" but in Mason v. Woodside Mills,( the expression was,
"any competent evidence". Both cases involved the Workmen's
Compensation Act; one was decided February 15 and the other
March 9, 11954. Furthermore, in the case of Mace v. Berry,7
the Court quoted from two of its earlier decisions8 with ref-
erence to the same Agricultural Adjustment Act. In one,9 it
2. S. C. ACTS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS 1954 No. 660, p. 1704. This act
amends §68-7 of the 1952 Code of Laws to read as follows:
"§68-7. 'Benefit Year' with respect to any individual means the one
year period beginning with the first day of the first week with respect
to which the individual first files a request for a determination of his
status as an insured worker, and thereafter the one year period begin-
ning with the first day of the first week with respect to which the
individual next files a request for a determination of his status as an
insured worker after the termination of his last preceding benefit year.
Any request made in accordance with Section 68-151 shall establish a
benefit year for the purpose of this section if the individual has been
paid wages for insured work as required under Item 5 of Section 68-113."
This provision was made effective upon approval by the Governor, which
was March 23, 1954.
3. 224 S.C. 407, 79 S.E. 2d 381 (1953).
4. Gurley v. Mills Mill, 225 S.C. 46, 80 S.E. 2d 745 (1954). Mason
v. Woodside Mills 225 S.C. 15, 80 S.E. 2d 344 (1954). Mace v. Berry,
81 S.E. 2d 276 (.C. 1954). A. C. L. Railroad v. Public Service Com-
mission, 81 S.E. 2d 357 (S.C. 1954).
5. 225 S.C. 46, 51, 80 S.E. 2d 745, 747 (1954).
6. 225 S.C. 15, 80 S.E. 2d 344, 347 (1954).
7. 81 S.E. 2d 276, 280 (S.C. 1954).
8. Lee v. Berry, 219 S.C. 346, 65 S.E. 2d 257 (1951). Lee v. DeBerry,
219 S.C. 382, 65 S.E. 2d 775 (1951).
9. Lee v. Berry, supra note 8.
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refers to "any competent evidence", in the other10 "substan-
tial evidence". Therefore it would appear "competent evi-
dence" is used interchangeably with "substantial evidence" and
not necessarily to be given the technical meaning it carries
when used in a context of common law rules of evidence.
However, it appears extremely unlikely that a reviewing court
would find "substantial' any evidence which was not compe-
tent in the technical sense.
Appeal of Conviction As a Stay of Consequential
Administrative Action
In Parker v. State Highway Department' it was held that
an appeal from a conviction of driving while under the in-
fluence of alcohol does not operate to stay the suspension of
the defendant's driver's license by the Department, which is
required by statute upon his "conviction" for such offense.
The Court agreed with the Department's contention that
the suspension of the license was not a part of the punishment
for the offense, and that it was therefore not affected by
"§ 7-6 of the Code of 1952, providing that notice of appeal in
a criminal case 'shall operate as a stay of the execution of the
sentence until the appeal is finally disposed of' .... 12
Recognizing the possibility of a harsh result in the occa-
sional case when the defendant's conviction is subsequently
reversed, it thought the legislature must have weighed this
against the beneficial effect of having removed from the high-
ways without any delay those properly convicted. Undoubt-
edly, the Court's decision was the proper one here; as it so
aptly said, "Upon such conviction, there is no longer a pre-
sumption of innocence."' 3
Effect of Equal Division Among Members of Reviewing
Administrative Agency
A unique situation arose in the case of Gurley v. Mills Mill 4
involving an award under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
After a hearing before the Full Commission reviewing an
award made to claimant by a Single Commissioner, the Single
Commissioner's term expired before he voted on the case be-
10. Lee v. DeBerry, 219 S.C. 382, 387, 65 S.E. 2d 775, 777 (1951).
11. 224 S.C. 263, 78 S.E. 2d 382 (1953)
12. 224 S.C. 263, 272, 78 S.E. 2d 382, 386 (1953).
13. 224 S.C. 263, 272, 78 S.E. 2d 382, 386 (1953).




Published by Scholar Commons, 1954
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY [
fore the Full Commission and the other four Commissioners
divided two to two. Subsequently, the Commission wrote a
letter informing claimant of this fact and ordering a second
review before the Full Commission on which the new Commis-
sioner had been seated. Claimant contended that the two to
two division was an affirmance of the Single Commissioner's
award and that the Commission had no power to order the case
reheard. Nevertheless, it heard the case again and reversed
the award by a vote of three to two. On appeal, the Supreme
Court held that there was no error in the Commission's pro-
cedure.
The Court said that the rule that a two to tvo division
of the Supreme Court results in an affirmance of the judg-
ment below is not controlling, because it is the application
of a specific provision of the State Constitution 15 requiring
a vote of at least three justices for a reversal.
Legislativ.e Delegation of Appointive Power
A case which deserves interest in the field of Administrative
Law is State v. Taylor."' This was an appeal from a conviction
in a Magistrate's court for violation of a statute17 requiring
a permit from the State Veterinarian to operate a livestock
market. The defendant challenged the constitutionality of the
statute on the ground, inter alia, that the Agency (a committee
which was granted the discretion to direct the issuance of the
permits by the Veterinarian) was illegally constituted, in that
the Legislature had delegated to the Clemson College Trustees
the power to appoint four members of the seven-man com-
mittee and provided that the president, vice-president and
secretary of the Livestock Dealers Association be the remain-
ing three members.
The Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion upheld the va-
lidity of the statute, answering the above objection with the
15. S. C. CONST. Art. 5, § 12.
16. 223 S.C. 626, 77 S.E. 2d 195 (1953).
17. CODE op LAWS Op S. C., 1952, § 6-334:
"Upon the filing of the application on the forms prescribed and the
giving of a bond as required in this article the technical livestock com-
mittee, composed of four men appointed by the board of trustees of the
Clemson Agricultural College of South Carolina and the president, vice-
president and secretary of the Livestock Dealers Association shall make
an official inspection of the premises of the applicant and if, in their
opinion, the owner of the proposed market can comply with the pro-
visions of this article the State Veterinarian shall issue the permit. This
permit may be revoked by such committee for violation of the provisions
of this article or the rules and regulations relating thereto."
Vol. 7
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assertion that the Clemson Trustees were especially qualified
for the assignment and that the officers of the Livestock Deal-
ers Association have a rational relation to the law to be ad-
ministered.1 8 The decision appears to indicate that the Court
would not have reached any different result if the committee
had been composed entirely of officers of the Association.
It might be inferred from the opinion that the only test to be
applied is, does the unofficial body to which the Legislature
delegated the appointive power have a "substantial and ra-
tional relation to the law to be administered"? The statement
of the Court which could give rise to this inference is,
But we have sustained the right of the Legislature to
vest in unofficial bodies the power of appointment to
public offices or boards where such bodies do have such
relation (substantial and rational) to the law to be ad-
ministered. 19
However, to assume that the Supreme Court intended in
this statement to indicate that that is the only test to be ap-
plied, is to overlook the fact that the case of Floyd v. Thorn-
ton20 was cited 2 ' as authority for it. The statute22 which was
upheld in that case provided for the appointment of the mem-
bers of the Board of Bank Control by the Governor, and the
unofficial bodies (State Bankers' Association, Building and
Loan Associations, etc.) were given power only to recom-
mend such appointees, and ,last, but not least, the appointees
recommended had to be selected from that limited group of
persons engaged in the respective branch of the banking busi-
ness.
Therefore, it would seem to be reasonable to say that Floyd
v. Thornton23 held that where a statute vests the actual power
of appointment in a public officer, and the exercise of that
18. 223 S.C. 526, 531, 77 S.E. 2d 195, 197 (1953).
19. Ibid.
20. 220 S.C. 414, 68 S.E. 2d 234 (1951).
21. See footnote 18 supra.
22. S. C. CODE OF LAWS, § 7829 (1942).
"A state board of bank control is hereby created and established,
which shall be composed of five members, one of whom shall be the state
treasurer as an ex-officio member, who shall be chairman. The remain-
ing four members shall be appointed by the Governor, two of whom
shall be engaged in commercial banking and recommended by the state
bankers' association, one shall be engaged in building and loan associa-
tion business and recommended by the said associations and one shall
be in the cash depositories business and recommended by the represen-
tatives of the cash depositories affiliated with the state bankers' asso-
ciation." ..
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power is limited by the statute to those persons recommended
by an unofficial body and the Legislature has set some rea-
sonable qualification to be met by the appointees recommend-
ed, it will be upheld as a valid delegation of the power of
appointment, provided the Court finds that the unofficial
body has a substantial and rational relation to the law to
be administered. To say that that case approves a more ab-
breviated test, insofar as delegation of the appointive power is
concerned, is to ignore the express limitations on that power
which were contained in the statute. While it is true that
the Floyd opinion discussed only the "substantial and rational
relation" test, there was no need to discuss the others when
they were expressly imposed by the statute itself.
To return to the principal case,24 it would appear that the
delegation to the Clemson Trustees does no violence to the
rule in the Floyd case. The Trustees are public officers who,
in addition to their duties in relation to the College, are in-
trusted with the administration of numerous statutes25 related
to the agricultural life of the state. The power of appoint-
ment granted them by this act was not restricted by any pri-
vate or unofficial body; therefore, the Floyd case would have
no application.
As to the officers of the Livestock Association, the Court
noted that the appointment was made directly by the Legis-
lature rather than by delegating the power of appointment
to the group to select someone else.26 However, this appears
to be a distinction without a difference, when it is recognized
that the Association, by changing its officers, changes its
members on the Committee. So that, as a practical matter, the
appointive or elective power was delegated to the Associa-
tion. Therefore, it is apparent that this part of the statute
presented to the Court a question quite different from that
in the Floyd case, in that this unofficial body was empowered
not simply to recommend to a public officer, in whom power to
24. State v. Taylor, 223 S.C. 526, 77 S.E. 2d 195 (1953).
25. CODE OF LAWS OF S. C., 1952, § 3-21. E.g., § 3-21(5): "It [Board
of Trustees] may promulgate and enforce rules and regulations for the
guidance of the State Veterinarian, or any assistant of his, in the treat-
ment of horses, mules, cattle, hogs or other livestock or poultry or
domestic fowl of any kind affected with any dangerous or contagiousdisease; ... "1......
"(9) It, or a committee appointed by it, shall supervise and enforce
the execution of any duties devolved upon it; . .. "
26. "The legislature merely made certain designated officers of this
Association members by virtue of their office." 223 S.C. 526, 532, 77
S.E. 2d 195, 198 (1953).
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appoint was vested, but to elect its own officers without legis-
lative restriction on the manner of doing so, and thus appoint-
ing them to the Committee, without limitation on the group
from which they should be drawn 27 and without prescription
of any of the personal qualifications which the appointees must
fulfill.
This is the first case in South Carolina in which the Court
has gone so far as to approve such a delegation to a private
group,28 where in fact, it is restricted only by the appointive
power having met the test of a "substantial and rational re-
lation to the law to be administered." And even that test was
met only by the assumption29 of the Court that the officers of
the Livestock Dealers Association "have peculiar knowledge
of the workings of the livestock market and are thoroughly
familiar with the methods which should be employed to con-
trol diseases in livestock." An assumption which would be
doubted by many who, as some evidence of the reason therefor,
could readily cite the very statute in question which makes it
a crime to operate without the permit or without complying
with prescribed sanitary and other conditions. It has not al-
ways been assumed that those with the greatest pecuniary in-
terest in a particular commercial activity are those best fitted
for selecting the personnel of any agency set up to regulate
that commercial activity.30
There is no reason to believe that the Court would so cas-
ually enunciate a new principle of law with such far reaching
consequences and which would lower the standards that the
Legislature must fix before delegating to a private group
27. Except, of course, that an officer of the Association would be a
member thereof.
28. The very few earlier cases involved public officials. E.g., State
ex rel. Coleman v. Lewis, 181 S.C. 10, 186 S.E. 625 (1936).
29. "It is reasonable to assume that these persons have peculiar knowl-
edge.. ." 223 S.C. 526, 532, 77 S.E. 2d 195, 198 (1953).
30. E.g. The late lamented eminent Judge Lide's statement in Floyd
v. Thornton at p. 421: "We are unable to conceive of a case where there
is a more rational and substantial relation to the law to be administered
by the appointees than that involved in the statute before us. In other
words, the State Bankers' Association is obviously an organization
especially qualified for the selection of men to be appointed on the Board
of Bank Control", would seem to do no more than emphasize the em-
phemeral nature of public esteem when compared with the action of
our neighboring state of Georgia, which as recently as 1919 adopted a
statute which declared, ".... every insolvency of a bank shall be deemed
fraudulent, and the president and directors shall be severally punished
by imprisonment and labor in the penitentiary . . .; provided, that the
defendant . . . may repel the presumption . . .", which statute, happily,
was declared invalid by the U. S. Supreme Court in Manley v. Georgia,
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the power to appoint persons to positions, in some instances,
of enormous power. In a time when administrative agencies.
are ever increasing in number and in their reach, our Court
would require a compelling necessity for such a change. This
would seem to be particularly true when the only case cited in
addition to the Floyd case, was Ashmore v. Greater Greenville,
Sewer District,31 in which, so recently as 1947, the Court rec-
ognized the seriousness of this problem in the following lan-
guage :32
Such delegation by the lawmaking body to persons,
groups or organizations unrelated to government of power
to appoint or elect public officers constitutes a difficult
and important problem of constitutional law which has
vexed the courts and the text writers.
and narrowly limited its decision in that case as follows :3
The rule which we approve goes no further than to
invalidate attempted delegation by the legislature of the
appointive or elective power to unofficial persons or
bodies where the latter are without rational and sub-
stantial relation to the law to be administered by the
appointees or electees or, we add, to the public institu-
tion to be governed.
It should be noted that in the Ashmore case the Court
pointed to the absence of "a substantial and rational relation"
and found it a fatal defect in the statute involved. It would
be an obvious fallacy to contend that this justifies the propo-
sition that the presence of such a relation is proof of the stat-
ute's validity.3
4
Since neither the Floyd nor Ashmore cases appear to be
authority for this decision, and nothing indicates any intent
on the part of the Court to enunciate a new principle, the
justification of the result must lie in the particular facts of
the case. Foremost among these may well have been a fact
which did not appear in the report of the case but which is
found in the Respondent's brief :35 the defendant had never
applied for a permit. Furthermore, four of the seven-man
committee-a majority-were to be appointed by the Clemson
31. 211 S.C. 77, 44 S.E. 2d 88 (1947).
32. 211 S.C. 77, 93, 44 S.E. 2d 88 (1947).
33. 211 S.C. 77,95,44 S.E. 2d 88 (1947).
34. Because a three-legged stool without one leg will not stand, doe&
not prove that any chair with three legs will stand.
35. P. 6, second paragraph.
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Trustees. Although the Court did not say that this majority
control by Clemson was even a factor in its consideration, the
hearty endorsement of the Trustees' qualifications which it
did express, may be indicative of its influence.
9
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